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Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close
to home-so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of
the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person: the
neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory,
farm, or office where he works. Such are the places where every man,
woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity
without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they
have little meaning anywhere.
-Eleanor Roosevelt'
... one nation, indivisible, with liberty andjustice for all.
-Francis

Bellamy2

I. INTRODUCTION

If someone is tortured, at a minimum, an intentional tort has been committed
against that person. This Article specifically addresses the civil tort remedy, or
lack thereof, for victims who are tortured by employees of the United States.' In

1. Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating International
Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139, 139 (2006); Patty Allread, Making
Human Rights a Global Reality, C. AVENUE, Fall 2006, at 10; Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural
Principleof InternationalHuman Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 38 (2003).
2. John W. Baer, The Pledge of Allegiance: A Short History (1992), http://www.oldtimeislands.
org/pledge/pledge.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). See generally John W. Baer, THE PLEDGE OF
ALLEGIANCE, A REVISED HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 1892-2007, at 5 (2007).
3. This Article specifically addresses only civil tort issues and, therefore, does not address constitutional
issues. Potential remedies for constitutional violations and the legal vehicle (and to whom this legal vehicle is
available or not available) that can be used to bring suit for constitutional violations, pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), are beyond the immediate scope of this Article. However,
generally speaking, constitutional rights and privileges do not apply extraterritorially to nonresident aliens. See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692-93 (2001); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Likewise,
because the main focus of this Article is civil tort remedies for victims of torture, criminal liability and related
issues are also beyond the scope of this Article. But see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A, 2340B (2006) (the
Federal Torture Statute); 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006) (Section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005).
Moreover, this Article concentrates on civil tort liability for actions by employees of the United States.
Therefore, liability for contractors of the United States is also beyond the scope and focus of this Article.
However, as a general statement of law, the United States is not liable for the acts or inactions of its contractors.
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ratifying the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and in its subsequent reporting to the
United Nations Committee Against Torture, the United States has consistently
denounced torture and proclaimed itself to be a nation that provides for civil
remedies against torturers. However, this Article will draw attention to the
hypocrisy and self-protection tactics of the United States when dealing with
torturers employed by the United States, as opposed to foreign torturers. One of
the key inequities addressed in this Article is the current application of the
Westfall Act codified, in part, in 28 U.S.C. § 2679.4
This Article begins with an examination of how the United States has
allowed, and even promoted, the availability of civil tort remedies against foreign
torturers.! Next, a critical comparison is made in regard to the availability, or lack
thereof, of civil tort remedies when the alleged torturer is an employee of the
United States Government. Particularly, this Article will examine how the
Westfall Act, and the torture-relevant exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
can leave victims of torture without any tort remedy at all when the perpetrator is
an employee of the United States-while victims of torture by foreign nationals
are permitted to seek civil tort remedies in United States courts. 6
This Article then addresses two international human rights treaties ratified by
the United States: the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.! By and through these two treaties, the United States is obligated
under international law to condemn torture and provide victims with adequate
legal remedies for compensation. Next, this Article will examine the reservations,
understandings and declarations asserted by the United States when ratifying
these treaties and explain the effect of these conditions on treaty enforcement by
torture victims. Additionally, this Article will address how the Westfall Act, in
combination with the torture-relevant exclusions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
violates the international treaty obligations of the United States. Finally, this
Article recommends that the United States amend 28 U.S.C. § 2679 in order to
comply with its obligations under international law and provide a domestic civil
tort remedy to victims of torture by the United States.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006) ("As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term
'Federal agency' . . . does not include any contractor with the United States.").
4. Pub. L. No. 100-694 (Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988) was
partitioned and codified in various sections of the U.S. Code that are part of the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (2006). This legislation is commonly referred to as the "Westfall Act" - named
after the Supreme Court of the United States case of Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988), which was
legislatively abrogated by the Westfall Act. See In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp.
2d 85, 110 (D.D.C. 2007). The Federal Tort Claims Act, in its entirety, is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680.
5. See infra Part HI.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
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H. FOREIGN TORTURERS
If a foreign national is tortured by a fellow foreign national, the United States
will, indeed, allow the foreign victim to sue his or her foreign torturer in a United
States court. The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a statute that is over 220 years old
and which was rarely used or cited until 1980, allows a foreign national who has
been the victim of a tort, such as torture, to file suit in the courts of the United
States against his or her foreign torturer.
A. Filartiga and the Alien Tort Statute
In the 1980 landmark decision of Filartigav. Pena-Irala,'the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "whenever an alleged torturer is found and served
with process by an alien within our borders, [the ATS] provides federal
jurisdiction" because "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official
authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties."'o
The Filartiga case was filed by Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter, Dolly
Filartiga, both citizens of Paraguay, in regard to Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-yearold son, Joelito." The Filartigas alleged that Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, the
Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay at the time, kidnapped,
tortured and murdered Joelito in retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's political views and
activities.12 Specifically, Dolly Filartiga alleged that the Asuncion police escorted
her to Pena-Irala's home and showed her the torture-marked body of her dead
brother. As Dolly Filartiga fled the property in a horrified state, Pena-Irala
actually ran after her, shouting: "Here you have what you have been looking for
for so long and what you deserve. Now shut up." 4
After the death of her brother in 1978, Dolly Filartiga entered the United
States under a visitor's visa, applied for permanent political asylum and took-up
residence in Washington D.C.'- Around the same time, Pena-Irala also entered
the United States and began residing in Brooklyn under a visitor's visa. 6
However, Pena-Irala remained in the United States beyond the terms of his visa. 7
When Dolly Filartiga learned of his unlawful presence in the United States, she

8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International
Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 16 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 607, 608-10 (2004).
9. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. Id. at 878.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 879.
16. Id. at 878.
17. Id. at 878-79.
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reported him to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.' As a result, PenaIrala was arrested, detained and ordered to be deported.' 9 Before he was deported,
Dolly Filartiga had Pena-Irala formally served with a civil tort lawsuit, filed
under the ATS, for the kidnapping, torture and murder of her brother.20
The District Court granted Pena-Irala's motion to dismiss for lack of federal
jurisdiction.2 ' In reversing the District Court's order of dismissal, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that torture by a state official is a violation of
established norms and, therefore, a violation of international law.22 Accordingly,
there was federal jurisdiction under the ATS, which reads: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations [international law] or a treaty of the
United States." 23 As Filartiganoted, "there are few, if any, issues in international
law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a state's
power to torture persons held in its custody." 24 "Although torture was once a
routine concomitant of criminal interrogations in many nations, during the
modern and hopefully more enlightened era it has been universally renounced."25
Thus, the seminal Filartigacase made clear that the judiciary will not tolerate
torture and that a foreign victim may sue a foreign torturer in the courts of the
United States if personal jurisdiction can be obtained.
While Filartigaclearly demonstrates that a foreign national may use the ATS
to sue another foreign national, it is less clear whether a foreign national may use
the ATS to sue a citizen employee of the United States. In the case of Lopez v.
Richardson,26 the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, without
elaborating on exactly what the "obvious reasons" were or how "a significant
change to the legal landscape" would result, held that "[w]hile there is nothing in
the language of the Alien Tort Statute that precludes its use against domestic U.S.
actors, there are obvious reasons why allowing domestic actors to be held liable
under the Alien Tort Statute would result in a significant change to the legal
landscape."27 However, in the case of In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees
Litigation,28 a 2007 case of which the 2009 Lopez court certainly should have
been aware, the foreign plaintiffs did just what the Lopez court later denouncedthey used the ATS as a tort vehicle to sue citizen employees of the United

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 879.
Id. at 879-80.
Id.
Id. at 879-80.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 878; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881.
Id. at 884.
Lopez v. Richardson, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
Id. at 1363-64.
In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
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States.29 As will be more fully discussed below, however, the Westfall Act
renders moot the specific legal vehicle chosen when filing a tort claim against an
employee of the United States. Whether a tort suit is brought by a foreign
national against an employee of the United States using the legal vehicle of the
ATS or the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), or both, the absolute statutory
immunity of the Westfall Act can be invoked by a defendant employee of the
United States. 30 Therefore, no matter what tort statute is invoked when suit is
originally filed, "[t]he litigation is thereafter governed by the Federal Tort Claims
Act."30
B. The Torture Victim ProtectionAct of 1991
It took twelve years, but in 1992, the Congress of the United States bolstered
the sentiment and message of Filartigaby passing and implementing the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).32 Specifically, the TVPA sets forth the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991'.
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ACTION.
(a) Liability.-An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable
for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative,
or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful
death.
(b) Exhaustion of Remedies.-A court shall decline to hear a claim under
this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available
remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim
occurred.

29. Id. at 109-116; see also Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
30. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 230 (2007).
31. Id.
32. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (The TVPA was
introduced as a bill in 1991 but was not actually passed into law until 1992). The ATS and TVPA are both antitorture legislation, and they are both codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350. However, the ATS is primarily a source of
subject matter jurisdiction while the TVPA provides a substantive cause of action and legal remedy for torture
victims. Id.; see Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246-47 (11th Cir. 2005).
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(c) Statute of Limitations.-No action shall be maintained under this
section unless it is commenced within 10 years after the cause of action
arose.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
(a) Extrajudicial Killing.-For the purposes of this Act, the term
'extrajudicial killing' means a deliberated killing not authorized by a
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing
that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority
of a foreign nation.
(b) Torture.-For the purposes of this Act(1) the term 'torture' means any act, directed against an individual in
the offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent
in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as
obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a
confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused
by or resulting from(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality."

33.

Id. (emphasis added).

249

2011 / Torture,American Style: A Recipe For Civil Tort Immunity
In one sense, the TVPA took the reasoning in Filartigaone step further-but
is still one critical step short of being universally fair and equitable. In Filartiga,
the plaintiffs were foreign nationals and relatives of a foreign torture and murder
victim, who brought suit against a foreign national defendant for acts committed
on foreign soil. While the TVPA adds a caveat for exhaustion of "adequate and
available" local remedies, which one may consider as being applicable to
foreigners, standing is not actually limited to foreign national plaintiffs.34 Under
the TVPA, a victimized plaintiff filing suit in the United States may be either a
citizen or non-citizen of the United States." The TVPA's expansion of the
potential class of plaintiffs over that of the ATS, where a potential plaintiff may
only be "an alien," is certainly a progressive step forward. But while the TVPA
expands the potential class of plaintiffs over the ATS, it constricts the class of
defendants by explicitly limiting claims to acts committed under the color of law
"of any foreign nation," as opposed to those of the United States." As a result,
the TVPA contains a double-standard and a hypocritical message-torture
committed by foreign nations is universally wrong and will not be tolerated while
torture committed by the United States remains exempt from the rules.
Filartiga,the ATS and the TVPA send a very clear message that torturers
from other nations are not to use the United States as a safe haven. However,
noticeably absent is the message that the United States will also hold its own
employees civilly liable in tort for acts of torture.
III. TORTURERS EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED STATES

Before Westfall v. Erwin", federal employees generally held common law
tort immunity for any actions within the scope of employment." The Supreme
Court established in Westfall that the federal scope of employment tort immunity
is limited, not absolute, which prompted Congress to pass the Westfall
amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act.4
A. Westfall v. Erwin
On January 13, 1988, the Supreme Court issued its unanimous opinion in the
case of Westfall v. Erwin.4 1 Westfall was not actually about torture. 42 Rather,
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Compare id. with 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
37. See §2, 106 Stat. at 73.
38. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988) superseded by statute, Federal Employees Liability Reform
and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No 100-694, 102 Stat. 563.
39. See generally id.
40. See generally id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 293-94.
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Westfall was about exposure to toxic soda ash.43 William Erwin was a civilian
employee of the federal government working at the Anniston Army Depot in
Anniston, Alabama." After being exposed to soda ash dust that had spilled from
a bag at his worksite, he suffered chemical bums to his eyes and throat. 45 Erwin
then filed a state-law tort claim in Alabama state court alleging that three
Executive Branch employees were responsible for his injuries due to their
negligence in routing, storing and warning him about the soda ash." One of the
defendants was Rodney P. Westfall, who was in charge of receiving at the Army
Depot. 47
The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the
48
Northern District of Alabama. There, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that "any federal employee is
entitled to absolute immunity for ordinary torts committed within the scope of
their jobs." 49 Erwin then appealed the District Court's decision to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.O The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court's decision, holding that a federal employee enjoys absolute immunity from
suit "only if the challenged conduct is a discretionary act and is within the outer
perimeter of the actor's line of duty."" Accordingly, a federal employee would
not be immune for conduct that was non-discretionary or an ordinary job
function. The defendants then sought certiorari from the Supreme Court, which
12
was granted.
The United States Supreme Court first explained the reason for common law
absolute immunity for federal employees as follows:
The purpose of such official immunity is not to protect an erring official,
but to insulate the decisionmaking process from the harassment of
prospective litigation. The provision of immunity rests on the view that
the threat of liability will make federal officials unduly timid in carrying
out their official duties, and that effective government will be promoted
if officials are freed of the costs of vexatious and often frivolous
damages suits. (citations omitted). This Court always has recognized,
however, that official immunity comes at a great cost. An injured party
with an otherwise meritorious tort claim is denied compensation simply
because he had the misfortune to be injured by a federal official.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 293 n.1.
Id. at 294.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Johns v. Pettibone Corp., 769 F.2d 724, 728 (1 Ith Cir. 1985)).
Id. at 295.
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Moreover, absolute immunity contravenes the basic tenet that individuals
be held accountable for their wrongful conduct."
The Court went on to explain that "absolute immunity from state-law tort
actions should be available only when the conduct of federal officials is within
the scope of their official duties and the conduct is discretionary in nature."m
Accordingly, a federal employee simply following procedures and guidelines in
his or her employment would not enjoy absolute immunity, while a federal
employee involved in policymaking would enjoy absolute immunity so that the
fear of possible suits would not interfere with his or her discretionary job
function."
"[T]he scope of absolute official immunity afforded federal employees is a
matter of federal law, 'to be formulated by the courts in the absence of legislative
action by Congress."' 56 "Congress is in the best position to provide guidance for
the complex and often highly empirical inquiry into whether absolute immunity
is warranted in a particular context."57 Therefore, Congress did exactly that after
the Supreme Court issued the Westfall decision-it took action and provided
guidance by enacting the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act, which is more commonly referred to as the Westfall Act.
B. The Westfall Act
The intent of the Westfall Act was to abrogate the United States Supreme
Court decision in Westfall v. Erwin and to stop the judicial erosion of common
law immunity from tort suits for rank and file government employees sued for
actions occurring within the scope of their employment.59 Congress clearly
explained the purpose of the Westfall Act was "to protect Federal employees
from personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of their
employment, while providing persons injured by the common law torts of
Federal employees with an appropriate remedy against the United States."a
Congress was concerned that the "erosion of immunity of Federal employees
from common law tort liability ha[d] created an immediate crisis involving the
prospect of personal liability and the threat of protracted personal tort litigation

53. Id.
54. Id. at 297-98.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 295 (quoting Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959)).
57. Id. at 300.
58. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694,
102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679).
59. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102
Stat. 4563.
60. § 2(b), 102 Stat. at 4564.
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for the entire Federal workforce."" Moreover, Congress found that "[t]he
prospect of such liability [would] seriously undermine the morale and well being
of Federal employees, impede the ability of agencies to carry out their missions,
and diminish the vitality of the Federal Tort Claims Act as the proper remedy for
Federal employee torts."6 Therefore, to remedy the issue, Congress replaced
judicially eroding common law immunity with absolute statutory immunity for
government employees sued in tort for acts committed within the scope of their
employment.
However, Congress failed to consider the Westfall Act would leave tort
victims, including victims of torture, with no civil tort recourse at all when: (1)
the government employees have absolute immunity; (2) the United States is the
party defendant; and (3) the United States enjoys absolute sovereign immunity
due to the fact that the tort at issue, such as torture, falls under an exception to the
FTCA. Congress, through the Westfall Act, has provided government employees
with the first part of the recipe for absolute tort immunity from torture claims. In
order to be declared absolutely immune from suit in tort for acts of torture, be
dropped from the lawsuit and have the United States substituted in as the party
defendant, all a federal employee must do is have the Attorney General, or a
designee, certify that the tortious conduct at issue was performed while acting
within the scope of employment for the United States. If the Attorney General
refuses to do so, then the government employee need only move the court to hold
that the employee performed the tortious conduct at issue within the scope of his
or her employment with the United States government.64
If the court drops the government employee as a party defendant and
substitutes in the United States, one would think a torture victim could then
receive some sort of civil tort redress directly from the United States. After all,
this was the express intent of Congress in the public law comments to the
Westfall Act.65 In regard to torture claims, however, a court may soon thereafter
dismiss the United States as a party due to the torture relevant exceptions to the
FTCA.
C. FederalTort Claims Act
As an independent and sovereign nation, the United States of America enjoys
sovereign immunity-meaning that "the United States cannot be sued without its

61. Id. §2(a)(5).
62. Id. §2(a)(6).
63. 28 U.S.C. §2679(d)(1) (2006).
64. Id. §2679(d)(3).
65. See §2(b), 102 Stat. at 4564 ("It is the purpose of this Act to protect Federal employees from
personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of their employment, while providing
persons injured by the common law torts of Federal employees with an appropriateremedy against the United
States.") (emphasis added).
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consent."" However, "Congress alone has the power to waive or qualify that
immunity."6 By enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")," Congress did
just that." With various exemptions and exceptions, the FTCA generally lends
the United States to civil tort liability for:
[I]njury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.70
At first blush, this waiver appears to establish a prima facie basis for torture
liability in tort. Torture is certainly a "personal injury."" It is inflicted as a result
of the "wrongful act . .. of ...

[an] employee of the government while acting

within the scope of his [or her] office or employment."72 Torture is also a jus
cogens violation under international law and is, therefore, prohibited by law in
"the place where the act . .. occurred.""

However, while the Westfall Act provides absolute statutory immunity to the
individual government employee and then substitutes the United States as the
party defendant, the Westfall Act also permits the United States to assert any
affirmative defense it may have under the FTCA in order to completely dismantle
the claim.7 4 If an exception to the FTCA applies, then the United States has not
waived its sovereign immunity and is still absolutely immune from liability in
tort.7 ' This is especially true in torture claims which lend themselves to FTCA
exceptions to torts. Examples include claims: (1) involving discretionary duties
or functions-even if such discretion is abused;16 (2) arising from assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution or abuse of processunless committed by an investigative or law enforcement officer of the United
States, which is defined as "any officer of the United States who is empowered
by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of
Federal law"; 7 (3) arising out of combatant activities of the military, naval forces

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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or the Coast Guard during times of war;78 or (4) committed in a foreign country.7 1
This is not an exhaustive list of the exceptions to the FTCA. Rather, it is a list of
the FTCA exclusions most applicable to torture claims, and to having torture
claims dismissed when the United States is the party defendant. Therefore, these
exceptions to the FTCA provide the second part of the recipe for tort immunity
for torture - as concocted by Congress.
To escape civil tort liability for torture, the United States may simply torture
those deemed enemy combatants in the war on terror by administering such
torture on foreign soil. A government employee who is not technically an
investigative or law enforcement officer escapes liability when that employee
performs a discretionary function of his or her government employment. Under
these circumstances, a torture victim cannot successfully sue the United States
because of the FTCA, nor can he or she sue the government employees involved
due to the Westfall Act. This scenario is not just a hypothetical possibility
conjured-up for the purpose of an academic article. The real life cases of In re
Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, Rasul v. Myers and Harbury v.
Hayden painfully illustrate this miscarriage of justice. While the United States
has actually reported to the Committee Against Torture that the FTCA provides
torture victims with an adequate avenue for redress, these cases certainly
demonstrate otherwise.
D. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation
In the case of In re Iraq and Afghanistan DetaineesLitigation,"'the plaintiffs
were detained by the United States during military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan." Subsequently, they alleged that they were severely tortured during
their detainment and, therefore, entitled to compensation in tort from Colonel
Janis Karpinski, Commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade; Lieutenant
General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of the Coalition Joint Task Force-7;
Colonel Thomas Pappas, Commander of the 105th Military Intelligence Brigade;
Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense; and the United States. The nine
plaintiffs claimed they were detained and tortured by the United States military in

78. Id. § 2680(j).
79. Id. § 2680(k). In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), the Supreme Court of the United
States demonstrated the strength of this exclusion when it held that "the FTCA's foreign country exception bars
all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission
[such as where the orders came from] occurred." Id. at 712 (emphasis added).
80. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Feb. 9, 2000, Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5, R 51, 269-70 [hereinafter. U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5J.
81. 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
82. Id. at 88.
83. Id. at 88, 90-91.
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both Iraq and Afghanistan despite their status as innocent civilians. They further
alleged that after being detained and tortured, they were all eventually released
without being charged with any crime." Specifically, they alleged that they were:
(1) hung upside-down from the ceiling by chains until being rendered
unconscious; (2) elevated by chains and then dropped to the ground; (3)
electrocuted; (4) anally probed; (5) beaten; (6) deprived of water; (7) deprived of
sleep; (8) stabbed; (9) urinated on; and (10) subject to mock executions." Clearly,
such alleged acts can be categorized as common law torts in addition to their
undoubted characterization as torture.
The plaintiffs claimed the defendants were responsible in tort because "the
defendants were directly and personally involved in establishing the interrogation
procedures" used on the plaintiffs." The defendants filed motions to dismiss
asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of
action. In specific relevance to this Article, one of the defense assertions was
that the defendants enjoyed absolute statutory immunity pursuant to the Westfall
Act. 9
The foreign plaintiffs did not sue the defendants under the FTCA." Rather,
the plaintiffs sued the defendants in tort under the ATS." However, the court
noted that whether a tort suit is brought by a foreign national against an employee
of the United States using either the ATS or the FTCA, "the Westfall Act
provides that, if the Attorney General or his designee certifies that a federal
employee was acting within the scope of his [or her] employment when an
alleged act or omission occurred, then the lawsuit automatically is converted to
one against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the federal
employee is dismissed as a party, and the United States is substituted as the

defendant." 92
The plaintiffs argued that their torture-based tort claims should not be barred
by the absolute immunity provided by the Westfall Act for three reasons.93 First,
the plaintiffs argued that the absolute immunity of the Westfall Act should not
apply to intentional torts that violate jus cogens norms, such as torture, because
the term "negligent or wrongful act or omission" as contained within the Westfall
Act is ambiguous and was not congressionally intended to apply to jus cogens
violations.94 Next, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants were acting outside

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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the scope of their employment and, therefore, that the Westfall Act should not
bar the claim.95 Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that violations of international law
fall within the Westfall Act's express exception for statutory violations that
provide for a cause of action against federal employees.9
In response to the first argument, the court refused to even examine the
congressional intent of the Westfall Act because such an examination of intent
was not appropriate when the intent could be derived from the plain and ordinary
meaning of the words Congress used.91 Using an ordinary meaning analysis, the
court held that an intentional tort, including torture, was clearly included within
the meaning of a "wrongful act."98 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
Westfall Act applies to intentional torts-including torture.99
In response to the second argument of the plaintiffs, the court did not accept
the plaintiffs' reasoning that jus cogens violations could never be considered
within the scope of employment simply because the United States deplores such
conduct and is bound to honor international law."'" Rather, the court held that the
Attorney General's certification that the tortious conduct at issue was performed
in the course and scope of the defendants' employment with the United States
was appropriate because, even if torture was used, "there can be no credible
dispute that detaining and interrogating enemy aliens would be incidental to their
overall military obligations.,,.o.
In response to the third argument, the court noted that there are only two
express exceptions precluding application of the Westfall Act: (1) Constitutional
violations and (2) actions substantively based upon a federal statute that
authorizes recovery against a federal employee.102 The court found none of the
exceptions to the Westfall Act were applicable because the ATS is merely a
jurisdictional statute and does not provide any substantive right of recovery
against a federal employee.o While the court only addressed the ATS and not the
FTCA, it is likely that the court would draw the same conclusion with respect to
the FTCA because the FTCA is merely a limited statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity for some common law torts and, like the ATS, it does not provide any
substantive cause of action or right of recovery against a federal employee.""
Again using an ordinary meaning approach to the word "statute," the court
concluded that international law, including international treaties, did not

95. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 110-11; 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(1).
98. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
99. Id. at 111.
100. Id. at 113-14.
101. Id. at 114.
102. Id. at 111; see also 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(2).
103. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 112; see also Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) ("the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action").
104. See In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
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constitute federal statutes in order to fit under the self-contained exception to the
Westfall Act.'os Accordingly, the court dismissed all of the tort claims against all
of the individual defendants as a direct result of the Westfall Act.'0
E. Rasul v. Myers
In Rasul v. Myers,' 7 four British nationals brought tort claims against former
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ten other senior military officials
employed by the United States, alleging they were physically mistreated while
illegally detained at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'o
Much like In re Iraq and Afghanistan DetaineesLitigation,the plaintiffs asserted
their common law tort claims using the ATS to obtain federal jurisdiction.'"
Pursuant to the Westfall Act, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's dismissal of the tort claims and stated:
We explained that the Westfall Act makes the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679 et seq., the exclusive remedy for any
damages action for torts committed by a federal official 'while acting
within the scope of his office or employment.' 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).
The Alien Tort Statute and Geneva Convention claims in Counts 1 to 4
were premised on alleged tortious conduct within the scope of
defendants' employment. Since plaintiffs failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies as required by the FTCA, the district court
lacked jurisdiction over Counts I to 4. "0
F. Harbury v. Hayden
In the case of Harbury v. Hayden,"' members of the Guatemalan army
tortured and killed a Guatemalan rebel fighter named Efrain BamacaVelasquez.112 The slain rebel fighter's widow, Jennifer Harbury, a United States
citizen, sued various CIA officials employed by the United States and claimed
that these individual employees of the United States were legally responsible for
the death of her Guatemalan husband. "'1 Pursuant to the Westfall Act, the District
Court dismissed the plaintiff's tort claims against the individual defendants and
substituted the United States as the party defendant, before proceeding to dismiss
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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the tort claims against the United States under the FTCA exception for injuries
that occur in a foreign country." 4 In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs
common law tort claims, the Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of the Government's
sovereign immunity. Under the FTCA, plaintiffs may sue the United
States in federal court for state-law torts committed by government
employees within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-80. But the FTCA does not create a statutory cause of action
against individual government employees."'
If a plaintiff files a state-law tort suit against an individual government
employee, a companion statute - the Westfall Act - provides that the

Attorney General may certify that the employee was acting within the
scope of employment 'at the time of the incident out of which the claim
arose.' U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Upon the Attorney General's certification,
the tort suit automatically converts to an FTCA 'action against the
United States' in federal court; the Government becomes the sole party
defendant; and the FTCA's requirements, exceptions, and defenses apply
to the suit. Id."6
If the Attorney General does not certify that the defendant employee was
acting within the scope of employment, the defendant may petition the
court to make such a finding. If the court so finds, then the case becomes
a federal-court FTCA case against the Government, just as if the
Attorney General had filed a certification. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3)-(4). If
the court finds that the government employee was not acting within the
scope of employment, then the state-law tort suit may proceed against the
government employee in his or her personal capacity."'
When one of the FTCA's exceptions applies-that is, when the
Government has not waived its sovereign immunity-the Attorney
General's scope-of-employment certification has the effect of converting
the state-law tort suit into an FTCA case over which the federal courts
lack subject-matter jurisdiction. In other words, the combination of the
scope-of-employment determination and the FTCA's exceptions may
absolutely bar a plaintiff s case. (citation omitted)."

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 417; see also 28 U.S.C.
Harbury, 522 F.3d at 416.
Id.
Id. at 416 n.1.
Id. at 417 (citation omitted).
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In order to avoid the exact procedure and outcome outlined by the court, the
plaintiff argued that the Westfall Act did not bar her tort claims because "acts of
torture can never fall within the scope of employment."" 9 However, the court
disagreed and set forth that the individual CIA employee defendants acted within
the scope of their employment by conducting covert operations and working with
individuals in Guatemala who tortured and killed the plaintiffs husband. 20
Therefore, the alleged tortious conduct of the individual defendants was
"incidental to their authorized conduct" as undertaken on behalf of the United
States. 2' In affirming the complete dismissal of all of the plaintiff's tort claims
against all defendants, the court held:
Because the alleged actions of the individual CIA Defendants were
within the scope of their employment, Harbury's claims against the
individual CIA Defendants are properly converted into claims against the
Government under the FTCA. But Harbury's FTCA claims against the
Government fall squarely within the FTCA's exception for claims
"arising in a foreign country." 28 U.S.C. §2680(k). 22
G. CongressionalIntent
While it did not result in a favorable ruling, Barney Frank, United States
House Representative for the Fourth Congressional District of Massachusetts,
filed an amicus curiae brief in favor of the plaintiff Harbury.123 Representative
Frank was a member of the 100th Congress, which passed the Westfall Act and,
in fact, sponsored the bill, wrote the House Report, and led the House debate on
the legislation.' 24 Clearly, if anyone knows what Congress truly intended to
accomplish by passing the Westfall Act, it should be Representative Frank.
Representative Frank wrote the true intent of the Westfall Act was to do
away with the exercise of discretion requirement for federal employees to be
absolutely immune from a tort suit, as required by the Supreme Court in Westfall
v. Erwin.2 ' He also noted that the Westfall Act was intended to make federal
employees acting within the scope of their employment absolutely immune from
suit and to substitute the United States as a party defendant so that federal
employees would not be burdened with garden-variety tort suits. Instead,
plaintiffs would be able to pursue a defendant with a deeper pocket, the United
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
Jennifer K.
124.
125.
126.
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States, for damages. In his brief, Representative Frank clearly set forth that it
was never the intent of Congress to immunize torturers.128 Rather, Congress
intended that any federal employee who committed outrageous or criminal
conduct, such as torture, would always remain personally liable-because such
conduct could never be considered as being part of the scope of employment
while working for the United States of America.129
The position of Representative Frank, as represented in his amicus brief, is
also well documented in the Congressional record. In a House Report,
Representative Frank expressed his intent and understanding with respect to the
bill that would become the Westfall Act when he set forth: "If an employee is
accused of egregious misconduct, rather than mere negligence or poor judgment,
then the United States may not be substituted .. . and the individual employee
remains liable."' 30 This was also the legal opinion and interpretation of then
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Willmore, who testified before a
Congressional subcommittee that under the Westfall Act, "employees accused of
egregious misconduct-as opposed to mere negligence or poor judgment-will
not generally be protected from personal liability for the results of their
actions.""'
The problem with Representative Frank's intent and understanding and with
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Willmore's interpretation and opinion
is that neither clearly represents the actual words of the Westfall Act. If Congress
did not want to provide absolute statutory immunity to torturers, then all it had to
do was expressly say so. Without actually amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679, it is
highly unlikely that the intent of the 100th Congress, as demonstrated by
Representative Frank, will ever be judicially recognized.
In conformity with a longstanding cannon of statutory interpretation, courts
read the words of a statute and apply and enforce the plain, clear, common and
ordinary meaning of those words-and will only properly look to the legislative
history for congressional intent when an ambiguity in the statutory language does
not lend itself to a plain and ordinary meaning. 3 2 Absent ambiguity, courts
presume that the legislature carefully chose its words and clearly intended what it
plainly expressed in the statutory language."' The mere fact that a statutory word
127. Id.
128. Id. at 6-10.
129. Id.
130. H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 5 (1988).
131. Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing on H.R. 4358, H.R. 3872, and H.R.
3083, Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 79 (1988) ("Westfall Committee Hearing"), (statement of Robert L. Willmore, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Division, Dept. of Justice).
132. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 186-87, 187 n.8 (2004) (advising against
interpretation of legislation that would depart with "longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative
history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text").
133. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399 (1805) ("Where a law is plain and
unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean
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or phrase is not used with a self-contained, express definition does not make the
word or phrase ambiguous. 34 On the contrary, undefined terms are simply read in
accordance with their ordinary meaning.' These principles explain how the
Harbury court, without passion or prejudice, applied the clear and plain language
of the Westfall Act and the FTCA exceptions without even addressing the
completely contrary legislative intent directly expressed by Representative Frank
in his amicus brief to the court.
H. The Problem Continues: Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld
The fact that tort immunity is provided to alleged torturers within the employ
of the United States is not an isolated or outdated issue-in fact, it is a recent and
continuing issue worthy of immediate congressional intervention. As recently as
February 16, 2010, in Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld,'36 another torture-based lawsuit
was dismissed as a result of the Westfall Act and an exception to the FTCA.'" In
Al-Zahrani, the plaintiffs were the survivors of two detainees that were held at
the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from sometime in 2002
until their deaths on June 10, 2006.' Among others, the plaintiffs sued twentyfour United States Government employees asserting an ATS cause of action. 3 9
The operable complaint alleged the detainees, Yasser Al-Zahrani and Salah
Ali Abdullah, were deemed by the United States to be enemy combatants and
subjected to violent acts of torture at the hands of United States employees.'4 The
plaintiffs further alleged that the two detainees were the victims of torturous acts,
"including sleep deprivation, exposure to prolonged temperature extremes,
invasive body searches, beatings, threats, inadequate medical treatment and
withholding of necessary medication . . . .,"14 The cause of death for both men, as
determined by the United States Navy, was suicide by hanging.142 The
government employee defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, while the
United States moved to substitute itself as the party defendant, in place of the
government employee defendants, and to then dismiss the complaint based on the
Westfall Act and an express exception to the FTCA.143

what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction.").
134. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,476 (1994).
135. Id. ("In the absence of ... a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary
or natural meaning").
136. 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2010).
137. Id. at 105-06, 113, 116.
138. Id. at 105.
139. Id. at 107.
140. Id. at 106.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 107.
143. Id. at 108.
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The court in AI-Zahrani granted the motion for substitution and specifically
referenced "the clear holding" in the prior decisions of Rasul and Harbury.'4 The
court dismissed the government employees, substituted the United States as party
defendant pursuant to the Westfall Act, and then proceeded to dismiss the United
States from the lawsuit under the foreign country exception to the FTCA, while
correspondingly rejecting the position of the plaintiffs that the United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay was not foreign soil.145
I.

ProposedAmendment

If Congress is troubled by the judicial decisions granting alleged torturers
absolute immunity from suit, then the following amendment to the Westfall Act,
currently proposed only in this Article, could solve the problem:
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b):
(1) The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b)
and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding
for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the
estate of such employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money
damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the
employee or the employee's estate is precluded without regard to when
the act or omission occurred.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an
employee of the Government(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United
States=or;
(B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States
under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized-or
(C) which is brought for acts of torture, violations of jus cogens norms,
or for conduct which is otherwise egregious or criminal in nature.146
Besides amending the Westfall Act to better represent and express the true
intent of Congress, and to end the gross miscarriage of justice in regard to tort
liability for torture, the United States also needs to amend the Westfall Act in
144. Id.atl5-16.
145. Id. at 119; see also 28 U.S.C. §2680(k).
146. In the author's proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), double strikethrough represents
deletion while underlining represents addition.
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order to comply with its international treaty obligations. As discussed below, the
United States has international treaty obligations that it must satisfy by and
through domestic law. The current state of the law, in regard to the Westfall Act
and the exceptions to the FTCA, does not satisfy the international human rights
treaty obligations of the United States.
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

The United States has ratified two major international human rights treaties
in regard to the prohibition of torture: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)147 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).148 By ratifying these two
international human rights treaties, the United States has obliged itself under
international law to provide individuals with the right to be free from torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment, 4 the right to make official complaints of
torture, 50 and the right to state compensation for torture."' Furthermore, the
ICCPR requires that the United States "adopt such legislative ... measures as
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the . . . Covenant." 5 2 It
also requires the United States to provide "an effective remedy" to victims and
"[t]o ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his [or her] right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities.

. ..

The CAT requires the United States to "ensure in its legal system that the
victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation. . . .
With the existing loopholes in the Westfall Act
and the exceptions to the FTCA, the United States clearly is not complying with
its international treaty obligations to provide torture victims with an adequate
remedy and compensation for torture committed by United States employees.
However, despite what is set forth in the CCPR and the CAT, the problem for
victims of torture is that nothing in these treaties can be directly enforced against
the United States by a torture victim using the courts of the United States.

147. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
CCPR].
148. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
April 18, 1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
149. CCPR, supra note 147, at Art. 7; CAT, supra note 148, at Art. 16.
150. CAT, supra note 148, at Art. 13.
151. Id. at Art. 14.1.
152. CCPR, supra note 147, at Art. 2.2.
153. Id. at Art. 2.3.
154. CAT, supra note 148, at Art. 14.1.
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A. Non-Self-Executing
Before addressing, in detail, that the United States has adopted the CCPR and
the CAT under the condition that both conventions are non-self-executing, it is
important to identify what a non-self-executing treaty is, why the United States
deems some treaties to be non-self-executing, and what effect it has on judicial
enforcement of legal protections against torture committed by United States
employees.
Briefly stated, "non-self-executing" means that one cannot go down to his or
her local courthouse and file a lawsuit for breach of a treaty obligation. But, the
analysis is a bit more complex than just this simple, yet accurate, description. In
the seminal Supreme Court case of The Paquete Habana,'" Justice Gray set
forth: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination."'56 Article IHl, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States,
reads, in part: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treatiesmade,
The Supremacy Clause,
or which shall be made, under their Authority. ...
contained within Article VI of the Constitution of the United States, states: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' Therefore, it appears, at
least initially, that all courts in the United States would treat international human
rights treaties as "the supreme Law of the Land."' 59 However, a review of judicial
interpretation reveals that the words of the United States Constitution are not so
deceptively clear.
While the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution references "Treaties,"'6 the
Supreme Court makes a distinction between treaties that are the judicial
equivalent of legislative acts and treaties that are merely contracts of politics
between nations-with the later not being a judiciable issue for the courts until

155.

175 U.S. 677 (1900).

156. Id. at 700; see also Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as L.aw in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555 (1984).
157. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
158. U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
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and unless the legislature enacts positive domestic legislation thereon.16 ' In Foster
v. Neilson,162 the United States Supreme Court set forth:
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution
declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislativeprovision.
But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of
the parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself
to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rulefor the Court.'6 1
Accordingly, treaties have been judicially assigned into two distinct
categories of justiciability: self-executing and non-self-executing.'" "[While
treaties 'may comprise international commitments ... they are not domestic law
unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms."" 65
To provide further clarity on the issue, the Supreme Court has set forth precisely
what it means:
The label 'self-executing' has on occasion been used to convey different
meanings. What we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has
automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a
'non-self-executing' treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically
enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effect
depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.'6
However, "[e]ven when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they
create federal law, the background presumption is that '[i]nternational
agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not
create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic
courts."" 6 Based on this legal presumption, several federal appellate courts have
held that absent express treaty language to the contrary, international treaties do
not create privately enforceable rights and, therefore, do not create justiciable
issues for individuals to litigate in domestic courts.6'
161. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829), overturned, in part, on other grounds by United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
162. Id.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008).
165. Id. (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
166. Id. at 1356 n.2.
167. Id. at 1357 n.3 (citing 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 907, cmt. a, p. 395 (1986)).
168. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
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While treaties may be binding international law, the bottom line is that
treaties ratified by the United States in non-self-executing fashion are,
domestically, nothing more than unenforceable ideals.'69 Why would the United
States not allow suits against itself or its employees in the courts of the United
States for its violations of ratified treaties--especially those that prohibit torture?
There are at least two possible theories: The "safety valve" theory and the
"window dressing" theory.7 o
The "safety valve" theory asserts that the domestic law of the United States is
not a complete redundancy of treaty rights. Therefore, the non-self-executing
declarations act as a safety valve to preclude the judiciary from domestically
enforcing any treaty rights that are not codified in existing national law. 7 ' The
United States takes the position that its domestic laws envelop its international
human rights obligations."' But, just in case there is a new treaty right that is not
redundant of national law, a non-self-executing declaration acts as a safety valve
to prevent any separate and unique treaty-based right from being asserted in a
national court. 73
The "window dressing" theory contends the United States makes domestic
law understandings and non-self-executing declarations as a form of window
Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2000) (en
banc); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992); Canadian Transp. Co. v.
United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979); see also, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the JudicialEnforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008); Aya Gruber, Sending the SelfExecution Doctrineto the Executioner, 3 F INT'L U. L. REV. 57 (2007); Gabrielidis, supra note 1; David Sloss,
Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a ConstitutionalFallacy,36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002); David Sloss,
Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (2000);
David Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarationsand Human
Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLuM. L.
REV. 2154(1999).
169. See, e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 370-76 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that non-self-executing
treaties are not binding on the courts); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1386-87 (E.D. Wash. 1998)
(holding that no private cause of action can be brought under the CCPR or the CAT in domestic courts); see
also Gabrielidis,supra note 1, at 156; Sloss, Ex Parte Young and FederalRemedies for Human Rights Treaty
Violations, supra note 168, at 1120-23; Vdzquez, supra note 168, at 2175-88; see generally Patricia M. Wald,
The Use of InternationalLaw in the American Adjudicative Process,27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431 (2004).
170. Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarationsand
Human Rights Treaties, supra note 168, at 189-90.
171. Id.
172. U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5, supra note 80, at 60; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, April 17, 1995, Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Initial Report of the United States of America (continued), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1402, 3 [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1402]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, April 17, 1995, Considerationof
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Report of the United States of
America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401 [hereinafter U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401], 1 34; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, April 17, 1995, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4, 1 8 [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/81/Add.4].
173. Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarationsand
Human Rights Treaties, supra note 168, at 189-90.
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dressing that enables the United States to comply with its treaty obligations
while, at the same time, not disturbing preexisting national law.'7 4 This window
dressing is then used as an enticement to secure the Senate votes necessary to
ratify the treaties in the first place.17 In contrast to a situation where ratification
would require comprehensive changes to domestic law, if the national law
already complies with treaty obligations then there is certainly more incentive for
the Senate to vote in favor of ratification.
Under either theory or reasoning, it appears clear that the use of non-selfexecuting treaty declarations with international torture treaties is just another way
the United States has insulated itself, and its employees, from domestic civil tort
liability while, at the same time, allowing for tort liability against foreign
torturers. An argument could be made that, under either theory, the United States
has violated general principals of international law by not ratifying the treaties in
good faith. It is arguably less than good faith to enter into a treaty that may grant
new and unique rights when a "safety valve" is also inserted in order to ensure
that any treaty rights are not wholly judicially enforceable. It is also arguably less
than good faith to enter into a treaty that may require some modification of
existing national law, and then to hang a negating "window dressing" to garner
the ratifying votes of lawmakers. Under either theory, the effect of the Westfall
Act, when coupled with the exceptions to the FTCA, is to deny civil redress for
torture committed by employees of the United States-in clear violation of many
international human rights treaties.
B. Reservations, Understandingsand Declarations
When the United States ratified the CCPR and the CAT, it only did so
conditionally by including a number of reservations, 7 6 understandings 7 7 and
declarations' 7 -sometimes
referred to as RUDs. While the United States
references the rights it ratified under these treaties in understanding to its own
constitution, the United States nevertheless made a point to declare that the
rights contained within the ratified treaties are not self-executing.'80 But it is
circular reasoning for the United States to adopt international human rights
treaties with the basic understanding that it already complies with those treaties
through its existing national law, while at the same time reducing its treaty
obligations to non-justiciable issues in national courts. In terms of entering into
and complying with the intent and purpose of the treaties, this certainly seems

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See infra app. A.
177. See infra app. B.
178. See infra app. C.
179. See infra app. B.

180. See infra app. C.
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like a somewhat less-than-good-faith effort on the part of the United States. This
is especially true when the Westfall Act and the FTCA deny torture victims the
very redress and compensation the United States promised by signing the
international treaties. And what only adds insult to injury is that, because of the
non-self-executing nature of the treaties, torture victims cannot even sue the
United States for its clearly apparent treaty violations.
The reservations, understandings and declarations made by the United States
concerning the CCPR did not go unnoticed by the international community.
Belgium,'"' Denmark,182 Finland,'
France,'" Germany," 5 Italy,'6 the
87
9
Netherlands, Norway,"' Portugal," Spain' and Sweden' 9 ' all raised comments
or objections to the conditioned ratification of the CCPR by the United States.
Likewise, the reservations, understandings and declarations made by the United
States concerning the CAT did not go unnoticed. Finland, 92 Germany, the
Netherlands'94 and Sweden'" also raised comments or objections to the United
States' conditioned ratification of the CAT.
In their objections, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden appear to
have hit the nail squarely on the head. Specifically concerning the CCPR, Finland
correctly objected that "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for failure to perform a treaty."'96 Portugal further objected "that
the reservation . .. in which a State limits its responsibilities under the Covenant
by invoking general principles of National Law may create doubts on the
commitments of the Reserving State to the object and purpose of the Covenant
and, moreover, contribute to undermining the basis of International Law.'
Sweden argued that it was completely unsatisfactory for the United States to take
the position that it can comply with a treaty by and through its already existing
national law. Specifically, Sweden objected:

181. See infra app. D.
182. See infra app. E.
183. See infra app. F.
184. See infra app. G.
185. See infra app. H.
186. See infra app. I.
187. See infra app. J.
188. See infra app. K.
189. See infra app. L.
190. See infra app. M.
191. See infra app. N.
192. See infra app. 0.
193. See infra app. P.
194. See infra app. Q.
195. See infra app. R.
196. See infra app. F.
197. See infra app. L.
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A reservation by which a State modifies or excludes the application of
the most fundamental provisions of the Covenant, or limits its
responsibilities under that treaty by invoking general principles of
national law, may cast doubts upon the commitment of the reserving
State to the object and purpose of the Covenant. The reservations made
by the United States of America include both reservations to essential
and non-derogable provisions, and general references to national
legislation. Reservations of this nature contribute to undermining the
basis of international treaty law. All States Parties share a common
interest in the respect for the object and purpose of the treaty to which
they have chosen to become parties.""
In regard to the CAT, the Netherlands objected by saying that "it is not clear
how the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America relate to
the obligations under the Convention. The Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands therefore objects to the said reservation."'" Sweden, through the
same method it used to object to the CCPR, asserted an additional objection to
the CAT based on the same reasoning.2 m Likewise, while commenting on the
CAT, but referring to its previous objection regarding the CCPR, Finland set
forth:
A reservation which consists of a general reference to national law
without specifying its contents does not clearly define to the other Parties
of the Convention the extent to which the reserving State commits itself
to the Convention and therefore may cast doubts about the commitment
of the reserving State to fulfill its obligations under the Convention. Such
a reservation is also . ..

subject to the general principle to treaty

interpretation according to which a party may not invoke the provisions
of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty.201
Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden appear to be uniform in their
opposition to the United States' attempt to limit its international human rights
responsibilities and obligations to its understanding of the scope and provisions
of the Constitution and other domestic law. These countries raise a very valid
point. The reservations, understandings and declarations made by the United
States in ratifying the CCPR and the CAT may substantially frustrate the true
intent and purpose of the treaties. By conditioning the human rights elicited from
the CCPR and the CAT to the confines of existing domestic law, the United
States deprives the international community of its commitment to the full scope

198.
199.
200.
201.
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of the rights these treaties purport to provide. Moreover, by not making the treaty
obligations self-executing, the United States also denies individuals, mainly
victims of torture, the right to domestic enforcement of treaty rights which are
not properly codified in existing national law-for example, the tort immunity
for torturers provided by the Westfall Act and the exceptions to the F1TCA. It
seems completely hypocritical for the United States to use its domestic law as a
justification for making treaties non-self-executing when, as with the Westfall
Act and the FTCA, United States domestic law does not comply with its
international treaty obligations.
Besides the initial reaction of other countries to the conditioned ratification,
the reporting requirements found in the CCPR 202 and the CAT203 are of particular
interest. These reporting provisions require all participating members to report to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations as to exactly what the reporting
members have done, legislatively, judicially and administratively, to give effect
to the provisions in each ratified convention. Afterwards, the reports are
considered by the appropriate committee. With suggestions, recommendations
and comments from other members, each respective committee then reports,
through the Secretary-General, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.2
As part of this treaty reporting process, the United States continues to make
clear that in ratifying international human rights treaties it does not intend to
create any enforceable causes of action to be litigated in domestic courts.20 " The
United States has done this purposefully through a mandate by the Executive
Branch and the Senate. 206 Despite this fact, the United States maintains that it
does not affect the international treaty obligations of the United States when it
ratifies a treaty that cannot be domestically enforced.207 In fact, the United States,
as misguided and uninformed as it is, continues to uphold that it already does
everything required by the ratified international human rights treaties through
enforcement of already existing laws. 20s The addendum to the United States'
202. CCRP, supra note 187, at Art. 40.1.
203. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
April 18, 1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, Art. 19.1.
204. CCRP, supra note 187, at Art. 40; 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 at Art. 19.
205. U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5, supra note 80, at 1 56; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra note 172,
at 1 12; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4, supra note 172, at U 8, 129, 111(1); Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, May 19, 2000, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention (continued), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.427, 8
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.427]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Apr. 24, 1995,
Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant (continued), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR. 1405,17 [hereinafter U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 14051.
206. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405, supra note 205, at 8; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra note 172,
at 112.
207. U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.427, supra note 205, at 8; U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5, supra note 80, at
57, 60; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1405, supra note 205, at U 7, 8; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supranote 172,
at H 38, 46; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/8 1/Add.4, supra note 172, at 1 8.
208. U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5, supra note 80, at 60; U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/SR.1402, supra note 172,
at 3, 25, 37; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra note 172, at 34; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4, supra note
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initial report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in
relation to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (CERD),'" is an illustrative example. In another human
rights convention that it conditionally ratified, the United States specifically
references the CCPR and the CAT by saying:
This [non-self-executing] declaration has no effect on the international
obligations of the United States or on its relations with States parties.
However, it does have the effect of precluding the assertion of rights by
private parties based on the Convention in litigation in U.S. courts. In
considering ratification of previous human rights treaties, in particular
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1994) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1992), both the Executive Branch and the Senate
have considered it prudent to declare that those treaties do not create new
or independently enforceable private rights in U.S. courts. However, this
declaration does not affect the authority of the Federal Government to
enforce the obligations that the United States has assumed under the
Convention through administrative or judicial action.210
The United States is aware of the Committee's preference for the direct
inclusion of the Convention into the domestic law of States parties. Some
non-governmental advocacy groups in the United States would also
prefer that human rights treaties be made 'self-executing' in order to
serve as vehicles for litigation.21 1
As was the case with prior human rights treaties, existing U.S. law
provides protections and remedies sufficient to satisfy the requirements
212
of the present Convention.
Declaring the Convention to be non-self-executing in no way lessens the
obligation of the United States to comply with its provisions as a matter
of international law. Neither does it contravene any provision of the

172, at 8.
209. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965,
660 U.N.T.S. 195.
210. International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Oct. 10, 2000,
170.
Reports Submitted by States Parties UnderArticle 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CERDIC/351/Add.1,
211. Id. at 173.
212. Id. at 17 1.
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treaty or restrict the enjoyment of any right guaranteed by U.S.
obligations under the Convention.2
If this is true, however, then why is it necessary to be "prudent" in excluding
international human rights treaties from domestic enforcement? This is a critical
question especially when there are clear gaps between the national law and the
international treaties-as illustrated in this Article. Moreover, the respective
treaty committees do not appear to agree with the United States' position on this
issue.214 The respective treaty committees would prefer if the United States
implemented the ratified human rights treaties by directly including the
conventions into domestic law.215 In fact, the respective committees have taken
the position that the stance of the United States on this issue actually contradicts
the principle that international treaties should take precedence over domestic
law." Furthermore, it has been relayed to the United States that it should rescind
its non-self-executing declarations in order to demonstrate full support of the
conventions. 7 This would certainly be another way to bridge the gap between
the domestic law and the Westfall Act and FTCA exceptions with the rights
provided in the CCPR and the CAT.
The flaws in the position of the United States can be illustrated with the
simplest of rhetorical questions: If the United States holds that it already
guarantees the rights recognized under the covenants through domestic law, then
why are the domestic courts being deprived of the opportunity to rely on the
conventions as the true law of the land? 218 Would it not be preferable to make
ratified human rights treaties self-executing so that individuals could invoke them

213. Id. at 172.
214. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405, supra note 205, at 7; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra note 172,
at
34, 46; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
July 25, 2006, Consideration or Reports Submitted by States Parties UnderArticle 19 of the Convention, U.N.
40 [hereinafter U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2]; Convention against Torture and
Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2,
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, May 12, 2006, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.703, 72 [hereinafter
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.703]; Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Feb. 8, 2006, List of Issues to be Considered During the Examination of the Second Periodic
5 [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
Report of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/CIUSA/Q/2,
CAT/C/USA/Q/2]; see also Margaret Thomas, "Rogue States" Within American Borders: Remedying State
Noncompliance with the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 90 CAL. L. REv. 165, 177 (2002);
Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV.
423, 461 (1996).
22, 27; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra
215. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1402, supra note 172, at
note 172, at 46.
216. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1402, supra note 172, at 22; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra note
172, at 135.
217. U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2, supra note 214, at 140; U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.703, supra note 214,
at 172; U.N. Doc. CAT/CIUSA/Q/2, supra note 214, at 15; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1402, supra note 172, at
22; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra note 172, at 48; U.N. Committee Against Torture, Report of the
Committee Against Torture, 180, U.N. Doc. A/55/44 (Nov. 8-19, 1999; May 1-19, 2000).
218. U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/SR.1401, supranote 172, at134.
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in domestic legal proceedings?" 9 In 2000, a Canadian national and the
Chairperson of the Committee Against Torture, Peter Thomas Bums, believed
so.220 At the 424th meeting in which the Committee Against Torture considered
the United States' initial report regarding the CAT, Mr. Bums stated: "Articles I
to 16 were non-self-executing and yet, according to the report, their provisions
indirectly formed part of United States law. Under those circumstances, would it
not be preferable to make them self-executing so that individuals could invoke
them in legal proceedings?"22 Since the conventions were intended to benefit
individuals, exactly how are individuals being protected if the convention rights
cannot be domestically enforced where domestic law may fall short of treaty
obligations? 222 And that is exactly what the Westfall Act and the FTCA do-fall
short of treaty obligations. As Omran El Shafei, an Egyptian national and a
member of the Human Rights Committee, noted in 1995 at the 1401st meeting in
which the Human Rights Committee considered the initial report of the United
States in regard to the CCPR: "[T]he purpose of treaties . . . [is] for States to
undertake new obligations, and in the case of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, to conform domestic law to international standards
enshrined in the Covenant. It . . . [is] regrettable that by its decision, the [United
States] Government . .. [has] prevented the Covenant from being tested in the
United States courts."22 Despite the United States' clearly inaccurate
representations that it fully complies with its treaty obligations through its
already existing national law, it is especially regrettable that the Westfall Act and
the FICA fall well short of complying with international human rights treatiesespecially since torture victims cannot use the conventions themselves to seek a
judicial remedy.
V. CONCLUSION

Whether or not they are fully implemented in domestic law, the United States
is obligated to respect the international treaties it ratifies.224 The Westfall Act and
the exceptions to the FTCA currently deny victims of torture an adequate civil
tort remedy. Not only do the Westfall Act and the FTCA result in violations of
the United States' international treaty obligations, they also result in a

219. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Feb.
9, 2001, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/SR.424, 1 16.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/Q/2, supra note 214, at 5; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405, supra note 205,
at$ 7; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra note 172, at 134.
223. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401, supra note 172, at 46.
224. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation,66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1235
(2005); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 752 (2004), ("For two centuries we have affirmed that
the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.").
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miscarriage of justice that is clearly contrary to the represented intent of
Congress. The end result is the United States takes a purely self-protectionist,
hypocritical position when compared to its position on civil tort liability for
torturers from other countries.
Accordingly, it is time for Congress to fix the problem it has created. While
House Representative Barney Frank has represented that it was never the intent
of Congress to shield torturers from civil tort liability, the fact remains that
Congress is obviously aware of the problem and, to date, has done nothing to
remedy the situation. 22 Therefore, Congress should amend the Westfall Act to
allow civil tort suits against employees of the United States when the tortious
conduct at issue is for torture and other jus cogens violations. Alternatively, the
United States Senate and the State Department should withdraw the non-selfexecuting declarations in regard to the CCPR and the CAT so that torture victims
can use the conventions as a source of legal rights not currently provided by the
national law-namely, the Westfall Act and the FTCA. An ideal situation would
be for the United States to do both. A change is clearly necessary to finally burn
the recipe for torture-related tort immunity.

225. See United States Code Classification Tables, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, http://uscode.
house.gov/classification/tables.shtml (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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APPENDIX A
[CCPR reservations made by the United States]
(1) That article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by
the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
(2) That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant
woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of
capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age.
(3) That the United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that
'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
(4) That because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the penalty in
force at the time the offence was committed, the United States does not adhere to
the third clause of paragraph 1 of article 15.
(5) That the policy and practice of the United States are generally in
compliance with and supportive of the Covenant's provisions regarding treatment
of juveniles in the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the United States
reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults,
notwithstanding paragraphs 2 (b) and 3 of article 10 and paragraph 4 of article
14. The United States further reserves to these provisions with respect to States
with respect to individuals who volunteer for military service prior to age 18.
(June 8, 1992). Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
[CAT reservations made by the United States]
(1) That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under
article 16 to prevent 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,' only
insofar as the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means
the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
(2) That pursuant to article 30 (2) the United States declares that it does not
consider itself bound by Article 30 (1), but reserves the right specifically to agree
to follow this or any other procedure for arbitration in a particular case. (Oct. 21,
1994). Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSO
NLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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APPENDIX B

[CCPR understandings made by the United States]
(1) That the Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee all persons
equal protection of the law and provide extensive protections against
discrimination. The United States understands distinctions based upon race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or any other status - as those terms are used in article 2,
paragraph I and article 26 - to be permitted when such distinctions are, at
minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. The United
States further understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of article 4 upon
discrimination, in time of public emergency, based 'solely' on the status of race,
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin, not to bar distinctions that may
have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status.
(2) That the United States understands the right to compensation referred to
in articles 9 (5) and 14 (6) to require the provision of effective and enforceable
mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or a miscarriage
of justice may seek and, where justified, obtain compensation from either the
responsible individual or the appropriate governmental entity. Entitlement to
compensation may be subject to the reasonable requirements of domestic law.
(3) That the United States understands the reference to 'exceptional
circumstances' in paragraph 2 (a) of article 10 to permit the imprisonment of an
accused person with convicted persons where appropriate in light of an
individual's overall dangerousness, and to permit accused persons to waive their
right to segregation from convicted persons. The United States further
understands that paragraph 3 of article 10 does not diminish the goals of
punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation as additional legitimate purposes for a
penitentiary system.
(4) That the United States understands that subparagraphs 3 (b) and (d) of
article 14 do not require the provision of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice
when the defendant is provided with court-appointed counsel on grounds of
indigence, when the defendant is financially able to retain alternative counsel, or
when imprisonment is not imposed. The United States further understands that
paragraph 3 (e) does not prohibit a requirement that the defendant make a
showing that any witness whose attendance he seeks to compel is necessary for
his defense. The United States understands the prohibition upon double jeopardy
in paragraph 7 to apply only when the judgment of acquittal has been rendered by
a court of the same governmental unit, whether the Federal Government or a
constituent unit, as is seeking a new trial for the same cause.
(5) That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative
and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the
state and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments
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exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take
measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent
authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for
the fulfillment of the Covenant. (June 8, 1992). Available at:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mt
dsg-no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
[CAT understandings made by the United States]
(1) (a) That with reference to article 1, the United States understands that, in
order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to
prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction
or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the
administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of
mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that
another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or
suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
(b) That the United States understands that the definition of torture in article 1
is intended to apply only to acts directed against persons in the offender's
custody or physical control.
(c) That with reference to article 1 of the Convention, the United States
understands that 'sanctions' includes judicially-imposed sanctions and other
enforcement actions authorized by United States law or by judicial interpretation
of such law. Nonetheless, the United States understands that a State Party could
not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the
Convention to prohibit torture.
(d) That with reference to article 1 of the Convention, the United States
understands that the term 'acquiescence' requires that the public official, prior to
the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter
breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.
(e) That with reference to article 1 of the Convention, the Unites States
understands that noncompliance with applicable legal procedural standards does
not per se constitute torture.
(2) That the United States understands the phrase, 'where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture,' as used in article 3 of the Convention, to mean 'if it is more likely than
not that he would be tortured.'
(3) That it is the understanding of the United States that article 14 requires a
State Party to provide a private right of action for damages only for acts of
torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that State Party.
(4) That the United States understands that international law does not
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prohibit the death penalty, and does not consider this Convention to restrict or
prohibit the United States from applying the death penalty consistent with the
Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, including any constitutional period of confinement prior to the imposition
of the death penalty.
(5) That the United States understands that this Convention shall be
implemented by the United States Government to the extent that it exercises
legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered by the Convention
and otherwise by the state and local governments. Accordingly, in implementing
articles 10-14 and 16, the United States Government shall take measures
appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the
constituent units of the United States of America may take appropriate measures
for the fulfillment of the Convention. (Oct. 21, 1994). Available at:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mt
dsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&ang=en#Participants.
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APPENDIX C

[CCPR declarations made by the United States]
(1) That the United States declares that the provisions of articles 1 through 27
of the Covenant are not self-executing.
(2) That it is the view of the United States that States Party to the Covenant
should wherever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions or limitations on
the exercise of the rights recognized and protected by the Covenant, even when
such restrictions and limitations are permissible under the terms of the Covenant.
For the United States, article 5, paragraph 2, which provides that fundamental
human rights existing in any State Party may not be diminished on the pretext
that the Covenant recognizes them to a lesser extent, has particular relevance to
article 19, paragraph 3 which would permit certain restrictions on the freedom of
expression. The United States declares that it will continue to adhere to the
requirements and constraints of its Constitution in respect to all such restrictions
and limitations.
(3) That the United States declares that the right referred to in article 47 may be
exercised only in accordance with international law. (June 8, 1992). Available at:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid
=1&mtdsg.no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
[CAT declarations made by the United States]
(1) That the United States declares that the provisions of articles 1 through 16
of the Convention are not self-executing. (Oct. 21, 1994). Available at:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mt
dsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
The Government of the United States of America reserves the right to
communicate, upon ratification, such reservations, interpretive understandings,
or declarationsas are deemed necessary. (Apr. 18, 1988). (emphasis in original).
Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE
&tabid=2&mtdsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&ang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Belgium in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
The Government of Belgium wishes to raise an objection to the reservation
made by the United States of America regarding article 6, paragraph 5, of the
Covenant, which prohibits the imposition of the sentence of death for crimes
committed by persons below 18 years of age.
The Government of Belgium considers the reservation to be incompatible
with the provisions and intent of article 6 of the Covenant which, as is made clear
by article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, establishes minimum measures to
protect the right to life.
The expression of this objection does not constitute an obstacle to the entry
into force of the Covenant between Belgium and the United States of America.
(Oct. 5, 1993). Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src
=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=4&ang=en#Participants.
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APPENDIX E

[Comments of Denmark in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
Having examined the contents of the reservations made by the United States
of America, Denmark would like to recall article 4, para 2 of the Covenant
according to which no derogation from a number of fundamental articles, inter
alia 6 and 7, may be made by a State Party even in time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation.
In the opinion of Denmark, reservation (2) of the United States with respect
to capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
age as well as reservation (3) with respect to article 7 constitute general
derogations from articles 6 and 7, while according to article 4, para 2 of the
Covenant such derogations are not permitted.
Therefore, and taking into account that articles 6 and 7 are protecting two of
the most basic rights contained in the Covenant, the Government of Denmark
regards the said reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Covenant, and consequently Denmark objects to the reservations.
These objections do not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the
Covenant between Denmark and the United States. (Oct. 1, 1993). Available at:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mt
dsg no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Finland in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
It is recalled that under international treaty law, the name assigned to a
statement whereby the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty is excluded or
modified, does not determine its status as a reservation to the treaty.
Understanding (1) pertaining to articles 2, 4 and 26 of the Covenant is therefore
considered to constitute in substance a reservation to the Covenant, directed at
some of its most essential provisions, namely those concerning the prohibition of
discrimination. In the view of the Government of Finland, a reservation of this
kind is contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant, as specified in
article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
As regards reservation (2) concerning article 6 of the Covenant, it is recalled
that according to article 4(2), no restrictions of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant
are allowed for. In the view of the Government of Finland, the right to life is of
fundamental importance in the Covenant and the said reservation therefore is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.
As regards reservation (3), it is in the view of the Government of Finland
subject to the general principle of treaty interpretation according to which a party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to
perform a treaty.
For the above reasons the Government of Finland objects to reservations
made by the United States to articles 2, 4 and 26 [ cf. Understanding (1)], to
article 6 [ cf. Reservation (2)] and to article 7 [cf. Reservation (3)]. However, the
Government of Finland does not consider that this objection constitutes an
obstacle to the entry into force of the Covenant between Finland and the United
States of America. (Sept. 28, 1993). Available at: http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg-no=IV4&chapter-4&lang=en#Participants.
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APPENDIX

G

[Comments of France in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
At the time of the ratification of [the said Covenant], the United States of
America expressed a reservation relating to article 6, paragraph 5, of the
Covenant, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by persons below 18 years of age.
France considers that this United States reservation is not valid, inasmuch as
it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.
Such objection does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the
Covenant between France and the United States. (Oct. 4, 1993). Available at:
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mt
dsg no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Germany in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany objects to the United
States' reservation referring to article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant, which
prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age. The reservation referring to this provision is incompatible with the
text as well as the object and purpose of article 6, which, as made clear by
paragraph 2 of article 4, lays down the minimum standard for the protection of
the right to life.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany interprets the United
States' 'reservation' with regard to article 7 of the Covenant as a reference to
article 2 of the Covenant, thus not in any way affecting the obligations of the
United States of America as a state party to the Covenant. (Sept. 29, 1993).
Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE
&tabid=1&mtdsg no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Italy in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
The Government of Italy objects to the reservation to art. 6 paragraph 5
which the United States of America included in its instrument of ratification.
In the opinion of Italy reservations to the provisions contained in art. 6 are
not permitted, as specified in art.4, para 2, of the Covenant.
Therefore this reservation is null and void since it is incompatible with the
object and the purpose of art. 6 of the Covenant.
Furthermore in the interpretation of the Government of Italy, the reservation
to art. 7 of the Covenant does not affect obligations assumed by States that are
parties to the Covenant on the basis of article 2 of the same Covenant.
These objections do not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the
Covenant between Italy and the United States. (Oct. 5, 1993). Available at:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mt
dsg.no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of the Netherlands in response to the reservations,
understandings and declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPRJ
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands objects to the
reservations with respect to capital punishment for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age, since it follows from the text and history of the
Covenant that the said reservation is incompatible with the text, the object and
purpose of article 6 of the Covenant, which according to article 4 lays down the
minimum standard for the protection of the right to life.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands objects to the
reservation with respect to article 7 of the Covenant, since it follows from the
text and the interpretation of this article that the said reservation is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Covenant.
In the opinion of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands this
reservation has the same effect as a general derogation from this article, while
according to article 4 of the Covenant, no derogations, not even in times of public
emergency, are permitted.
It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
that the understandings and declarations of the United States do not exclude or
modify the legal effect of provisions of the Covenant in their application to the
United States, and do not in any way limit the competence of the Human Rights
Committee to interpret these provisions in their application to the United States.
Subject to the proviso of article 21, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties, these objections do not constitute an obstacle to the entry
into force of the Covenant between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
United States. (Sept. 28, 1993). Available at: http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg-no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Norway in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
1. In the view of the Government of Norway, the reservation (2) concerning
capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age
is according to the text and history of the Covenant, incompatible with the object
and purpose of article 6 of the Covenant. According to article 4 (2), no
derogations from article 6 may be made, not even in times of public emergency.
For these reasons the Government of Norway objects to this reservation.
2. In the view of the Government of Norway, the reservation (3) concerning
article 7 of the Covenant is according to the text and interpretation of this article
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. According to article 4
(2), article 7 is a non-derogable provision, even in times of public emergency.
For these reasons, the Government of Norway objects to this reservation.
The Government of Norway does not consider this objection to constitute an
obstacle to the entry into force of the Covenant between Norway and the United
States of America. (Oct. 4, 1993). Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg-no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Portugal in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
The Government of Portugal considers that the reservation made by the
United States of America referring to article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant
which prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age is incompatible with article 6 which, as made clear by
paragraph 2 of article 4, lays down the minimum standard for the protection of
the right to life.
The Government of Portugal also considers that the reservation with regard
to article 7 in which a State limits its responsibilities under the Covenant by
invoking general principles of National Law may create doubts on the
commitments of the Reserving State to the object and purpose of the Covenant
and, moreover, contribute to undermining the basis of International Law.
The Government of Portugal therefore objects to the reservations made by
the United States of America. These objections shall not constitute an obstacle to
the entry into force of the Covenant between Portugal and the United States of
America. (Oct. 5, 1993). Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=l &mtdsg-no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participa
nts.
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[Comments of Spain in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPR]
After careful consideration of the reservations made by the United States of
America, Spain wishes to point out that pursuant to article 4, paragraph 2, of the
Covenant, a State Party may not derogate from several basic articles, among
them articles 6 and 7, including in time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation.
The Government of Spain takes the view that reservation (2) of the United
States having regard to capital punishment for crimes committed by individuals
under 18 years of age, in addition to reservation (3) having regard to article 7,
constitute general derogations from articles 6 and 7, whereas, according to article
4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, such derogations are not to be permitted.
Therefore, and bearing in mind that articles 6 and 7 protect two of the most
fundamental rights embodied in the Covenant, the Government of Spain
considers that these reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Covenant and, consequently, objects to them.
This position does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the
Covenant between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America. (Oct.
5, 1993). Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsgjno=IV-4&chapter=4&ang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Sweden in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CCPRJ
In this context the Government recalls that under international treaty law, the
name assigned to a statement whereby the legal effect of certain provisions of a
treaty is excluded or modified, does not determine its status as a reservation to
the treaty. Thus, the Government considers that some of the understandings made
by the United States in substance constitute reservations to the Covenant.
A reservation by which a State modifies or excludes the application of the
most fundamental provisions of the Covenant, or limits its responsibilities under
that treaty by invoking general principles of national law, may cast doubts upon
the commitment of the reserving State to the object and purpose of the Covenant.
The reservations made by the United States of America include both reservations
to essential and non-derogable provisions, and general references to national
legislation. Reservations of this nature contribute to undermining the basis of
international treaty law. All States Parties share a common interest in the respect
for the object and purpose of the treaty to which they have chosen to become
parties.
SWEDEN THEREFORE OBJECTS TO THE RESERVATIONS MADE
BY THE UNITED STATES TO:

-

article
article

2;
4;

cf.
cf.

Understanding
Understanding

(1);
(1);

-

article
article
article

6;
7;
15;

cf.
cf.
cf.

Reservation
Reservation
Reservation

(2);
(3);
(4);

-

article

24;

cf.

Understanding

(1).

This objection does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the
Covenant between Sweden and the United States of America. (June 18, 1993).
(emphasis
in
original).
Available
at:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=l&mtdsg.no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en#P
articipants.
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[Comments of Finland in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CAT]
A reservation which consists of a general reference to national law without
specifying its contents does not clearly define to the other Parties of the
Convention the extent to which the reserving State commits itself to the
Convention and therefore may cast doubts about the commitment of the reserving
State to fulfill its obligations under the Convention. Such a reservation is also, in
the view of the Government of Finland, subject to the general principle to treaty
interpretation according to which a party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty.
The Government of Finland therefore objects to the reservation made by the
United States to article 16 of the Convention [(cf. Reservation I.(l)]. In this
connection the Government of Finland would also like to refer to its objection to
the reservation entered by the United States with regard to article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (Feb. 27, 1996). Available
at:http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&
mtdsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Germany in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CAT]
[W]ith respect to the reservations under I (1) and understandings under II (2)
and (3) made by the United States of America upon ratification "it is the
understanding of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that [the
said reservations and understandings] do not touch upon the obligations of the
United States of America as State Party to the Convention." (Feb. 26, 1996).
Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&
tabid=2&mtdsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&ang=en#Participants.
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Q

[Comments of the Netherlands in response to the reservations,
understandings and declarations of the United States in regard to the CAT]
The Government of the Netherlands considers the reservation made by the
United States of America regarding the article 16 of [the Convention] to be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, to which the
obligation laid down in article 16 is essential. Moreover, it is not clear how the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America relate to the
obligations under the Convention. The Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands therefore objects to the said reservation. This objection shall not
preclude the entry into force of the Convention between the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the United States of America.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers the following
understandings to have no impact on the obligations of the United States of
America under the Convention:
II. 1 a This understanding appears to restrict the scope of the definition
of torture under article 1 of the Convention.
1 d This understanding diminishes the continuous responsibility of
public officials for behaviour of their subordinates.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands reserves its position
with regard to the understandings II. lb, Ic and 2 as the contents thereof are
insufficiently clear. (Feb. 26, 1996). (emphasis in original). Available at:
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mt
dsg no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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[Comments of Sweden in response to the reservations, understandings and
declarations of the United States in regard to the CAT]
The Government of Sweden would like to refer to its objections to the
reservations entered by the United States of America with regard to article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The same reasons for
objection apply to the now entered reservation with regard to article 16
reservation I (1) of [the Convention]. The Government of Sweden therefore
objects to that reservation.
It is the view of the Government of Sweden that the understandings
expressed by the United States of America do not relieve the United States of
America as a party to the Convention from the responsibility to fulfill the
obligations undertaken therein. (Feb. 27, 1996). Available at: http://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg-no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
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